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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by §78-2a-3(j), U.C.A. This is an
appeal from a final judgment, dated April 23, 1990, of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Notice of Appeal was
filed May 23,1990. On July 31,1990, this case was transferred to the Court
of Appeals by the Supreme Court pursuant to §78-2-2(4), U.C.A.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT I
THE TOTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS SO
AMBIGUOUS AS TO BE UNENFORCEABLE AND VOID UNLESS
MARGETTS' VIEW OF THAT AGREEMENT IS ADOPTED. ONLY
THAT VIEW MAKES ANY SENSE AND SHOWS A MEETING OF
THE MINDS.
POINT II
MR. SNOW HAD BOTH ACTUAL AND APPARENT AUTHORITY TO
ACT FOR AND BIND AMERICAN BY THE REPRESENTATIONS HE
MADE AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT MARGETTS
SIGNED.
POINT III
THE CASES RELIED UPON BY NEW WEST IN POINT V OF ITS
BRIEF DO NOT SUPPORT THE AWARD OF RENTAL VALUE.
INSTEAD THEY SUPPORT MARGETTS' POSITION THAT UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT AND
HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE.

iv-

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW - Continued:

POINT IV
NEW WEST'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE UNLAWFUL
DETAINER STATUTE HAS BEEN PROPERLY RAISED BELOW AND
THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER MUST BE
REVERSED.
POINT V
THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES FINDS NOT SUPPORT IN
THE RECORD AND HAS NOT BASIS IN LAW OR FACT.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

I.

The issue of construing several agreements together as one

transaction is a question of law and no deference to the conclusion of the trial
court is required. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740
P.2d 1357,1358 (Utah App. 1987).
II. The question of actual or apparent authority of an agent involves
mixed questions of law and fact which "do not require the deference due to
findings on questions of pure fact." Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195,
1200 (Utah 1985). Deference is to be accorded to facts found by the lower
court from disputed evidence but the legal conclusions resulting from those

v-

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW - Continued:

facts are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. Bellon v.
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089,1092 (Utah 1991).
III. The issue of fair rental value based on unjust enrichment is a
question of law to be reviewed for correctness since the underlying facts are
not in dispute. Whether those facts support a conclusion that all required
elements of unjust enrichment have been satisfied is a legal conclusion to be
reviewed for correctness. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470
(Utah 1989).
IV. The question of New West's compliance with the Unlawful Detainer
Statute is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness since all the
underlying facts are not in dispute. Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah
1988).
V. Since there was no evidence introduced at trial on the question of
attorney's fees, the propriety of the award of attorney's fees is entirely a
question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Commerce Financial v.
Markwest Corp., 806 P.2d 200,202 (Utah App. 1990).
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
By
Ralph J. Marsh
Attorneys for Appellant
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STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
Utah Code Annotated
§78-36-3 Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life.
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an
unlawful detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of
the property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or
period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall
be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with
monthly or other periodic rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant
after the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his
designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more
prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring him to
quit the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession
of the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days;
(c) when he continues in possession in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in the
alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises,
has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after service, which
notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due;
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or
when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any
nuisance, and remains in possession after service upon him of a three days1
notice to quit; or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after
a neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property,
-vii-

STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED - Continued:
served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within three
days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in actual
occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other person
interested in its continuance may perform the condition or covenant and
thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the covenants and
conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be
performed, then no notice need be given.
§78-36-6 Notice to quit — How served.
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served:
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to
the tenant at his place of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his usual place of
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place of
residence or place of business; or
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place of
residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased
property. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
California corporation, successor-ininterest to AMERICAN SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
California corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 90-0409-CA

VS.

JOHN L MARGETTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF

BECAUSE of certain new matters, both factual and legal, raised in
Appellee's Brief, Appellant deems it necessary to respond to and clarify those
matters.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant reaffirms the statement of facts in his initial brief and makes
the following clarifications or corrections to some assertions of fact made by
Appellee:
1. In paragraph 6 of its Statement of Facts, New West has stated that
"American Savings agreed to front the costs incurred in reaching settlement
-1-

agreements with all of the lienholders". This statement is misleading since
"fronting the costs" implies that Terrace Falls would reimburse those costs
later to American. That was not the intent and was not done. American simply
paid whatever was negotiated by its agent, Mr. Snow, to obtain the releases
from lienholders.
2. In paragraph 9 of its Statement of Facts, New West asserts that
American offered Margetts a credit of $150,000 and "Margetts accepted this
offer". The fact is that Margetts refused to accept this offer and did not sign the
agreements until Mr. Snow presented the Twenty Percent Agreement and
explained to Margetts that it would give him what he wanted, that only seven
condominiums had to be sold to completely pay for his condominium and that
American did not have to sign the agreement to be bound by it because
American would be Terrace Falls Condominiums. (See Statement of Facts,
1MI4-7, Appellant's Brief).
3. In paragraph 10 of its Statement of Facts, New West asserts that the
"stated purpose of the Twenty Percent Agreement was to permit Margetts to
participate in any windfall profits the Project developers might receive after
American Savings took over the project." Besides the unbelievability of this
assertion (see Appellant's Brief, pp.23-24), that is not its stated purpose. That
purpose is not stated in the agreement nor did Mr. Snow state to Margetts that
that was its purpose. That was only his explanation of it long after the fact
when he didn't want to be caught in the cross-fire between Margetts and New
West.

-2-

4. In paragraph 13 of its Statement of Facts, New West asserts that
Margetts was served with a Notice to Quit by certified mail in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. §§78-36-3 and 6. The evidence only shows that Margetts
eventually received a copy of the notice but not that it was served by certified
mail as required by §78-36-6, U.C.A. nor that it complied with §78-36-3, U.C.A.
The failure to comply with the statute is crucial to New West's attempt to
obtain a judgment under the unlawful detainer statute.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS ONLY
CLEAR AND ENFORCEABLE IF MARGETTS' VIEW OF IT
PREVAILS.
New West's claim that the purchase agreement is unambiguous ignores
the fact that the total agreement includes the Twenty Percent Agreement
which was the inducement for the signing of the purchase agreement. New
West admits those agreements are inconsistent. The total agreement is,
therefore, unenforceable and void unless Margetts' view of the total agreement
is adopted.

Only that view makes any sense and preserves the total

agreement.
II. MR. SNOW HAD BOTH ACTUAL AND APPARENT AUTHORITY
TO ACT FOR AND BIND AMERICAN TO THE TOTAL
AGREEMENT.
Mr. Snow was authorized by American to act for it in obtaining a release
from Margetts. Whatever he did and represented in the course of obtaining
that release is binding on American. If actual authority was not present, the
-3-

facts show that American placed Mr. Snow in a position where all offers and
communications came through him and Margetts was justified in relying on Mr.
Snow's actions and representations. American and its successor, New West,
are bound by the representations Mr. Snow made to Margetts as to the effect
of the agreement he was signing.
III. THE JUDGMENT FOR RENTAL VALUE IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY ANY OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT NOR HAVE THE ELEMENTS
OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT BEEN PLEADED OR PROVED.
A judgment for rent must be based either on an agreement to pay rent or
on unjust enrichment. There was no agreement to pay rent and New West did
not plead nor prove the essential elements of unjust enrichment.

Most

importantly, New West received a substantial benefit from Margetts'
occupancy and Margetts suffered a substantial detriment in not receiving his
condominium. Under those circumstances it cannot be concluded that it is
inequitable for Margetts to retain any benefit he may have received by
temporarily occupying the condominium.

IV. NEW WEST WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PROCEED UNDER
THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE AND THE JUDGMENT
FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER MUST BE REVERSED.
New West attempted to take advantage of the Unlawful Detainer Statute
without complying with its strict requirements. Margetts was not a tenant at
will under the statute and neither he nor his wife were served with a notice to
quit as required by the statute. Furthermore, his wife was not even joined in
this action so any unlawful detainer by Margetts caused no loss to New West
-4-

because she still had the right of possession. At most, only nominal damages
could be awarded.
V. THERE WAS NO CONTRACT, STATUTE OR EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES.
An award of attorney's fees must be supported by evidence. No
evidence was submitted to the lower court. There was no statute which
authorized attorney's fees and the only contract which provided for fees was
not in dispute and no judgment was obtained under that contract. In fact, New
West abandoned its claim under that contract.

That contract, the

Condominium Purchase Agreement, was only in dispute if the court held the
Twenty Percent Agreement to be a part of that contract, in which event
Margetts must prevail on the merits and attorney's fees should be awarded to
him.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
i

THE TOTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES IS SO AMBIGUOUS AS TO BE
UNENFORCEABLE AND VOID UNLESS
MARGETTS' VIEW OF THAT AGREEMENT
IS ADOPTED. ONLY THAT VIEW MAKES
ANY SENSE AND SHOWS A MEETING OF
THE MINDS.
New West has, in Point I of its brief, argued that the Condominium
Purchase Agreement was clear and unambiguous on its face and, therefore,
not subject to modification by extrinsic evidence. That argument may have
-5-

validity when applied to the Condominium Purchase Agreement itself. But that
document is not the agreement between the parties that is at issue in this case
and that argument ignores the reason for the entire dispute in this case. It is
without dispute that Margetts had refused to sign any agreement with
American until the Twenty Percent Agreement was presented to him and he
was assured that American would be bound by it. The Twenty Percent
Agreement was signed at the same time and as a part of the same transaction
as the Condominium Purchase Agreement and it, plus Mr. Snowfs explanation
of it, was the inducement for Margetts to sign the Condominium Purchase
Agreement. Therefore, the Twenty Percent Agreement was a part of the total
agreement between the parties and all of these documents must be construed
together as one agreement. Bullfrog Marina Inc. v. Lentz, 28 U.2d 261, 501
P.2d 266, 270-1 (1972), and the other cases cited on page 15 of Appellants
Brief.
When these documents are construed together as one agreement, even
New West admits that they are inconsistent (see Appellee's Brief, p. 10, lines
18-19) and, therefore, ambiguous. Resort to extrinsic evidence is necessary to
resolve the ambiguity and that requires the court to consider the statements
made by Mr. Snow to Margetts to induce him to sign the agreements. Those
statements, themselves, are admitted by New West to be inconsistent with the
agreements (see Appellee's Brief, p. 21, lines 4-6) but only those statements
explain why Margetts finally signed the documents after having refused to do
so for so long. Only when Mr. Snow told Margetts that he would get what he
wanted by such an agreement (the condominium he had bargained for), that
-6-

American "will be Terrace Falls Condominiums" and be bound by the
agreement and that "they only have to sell seven condominiums and your
condominium will be paid for" (R. 239, pp. 212-4)~only then, did Margetts sign
the documents.
Margetts' action in finally signing those documents, after refusing to do
so for so long, and the inconsistencies in the documents and the statements only
make sense if American was a party to the total agreement and was bound by
it. Otherwise, the total agreement is so inconsistent and ambiguous as to be
unenforceable and, therefore, void. Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc.,
558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976); Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U.2d 61, 362 P.2d
427 (1961). Preservation and enforceability of the total agreement require that
Margetts' view of the transaction be adopted. That requires that he be given
credit for twenty percent of the sales price of all condominiums sold against the
purchase price of his unit.
POINT II
MR. SNOW HAD BOTH ACTUAL AND APPARENT
AUTHORITY TO ACT FOR AND BIND AMERICAN
BY THE REPRESENTATIONS HE MADE AS TO
THE EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT MARGETTS
SIGNED.
In arguing that Mr. Snow had neither actual nor apparent authority to
bind American to the Twenty Percent Agreement, New West, in Point II of its
brief, has asserted that Margetts failed to show one fact suggesting that
American gave Margetts reason to believe that Mr. Snow was its agent. It has
further implied that Margetts had the responsibility to ascertain whether Mr.
-7-

Snow had authority to act for American. The fact is that Mr. Snow was
American's actual agent for the purpose of obtaining releases of the liens
against the Terrace Falls project and, therefore, those assertions are irrelevant.
By paragraph 3 of the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Agreement, Terrace Falls
and American agreed to cooperate in obtaining releases of liens against the
property. American further agreed to pay the amounts required to obtain those
releases (U4.E of Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Agreement). That required that
American authorize the amount to be paid, since Terrace Falls was not given a
blank check. Mr. Snow was directed to negotiate the settlement with Margetts
and each proposal he made was authorized by American. Mr. Snow was paid
for his services by American, which is evidence of actual authority.
American's admitted agents communicated directly with Mr. Snow as to what
they were willing to do to obtain Margetts' release. They authorized him to
make each offer and to prepare the required documents. Mr. Snow was
American's actual agent and acted as its attorney.

It is irrelevant that

American may have been advised by other attorneys or that Mr. Snow may
also have represented other parties. American gave Mr. Snow authority to act
for it and it is, therefore, bound by anything he did in carrying out American's
directions to obtain a release from Margetts.

Whenever the performance of certain business is confided
to an agent, such authority carries with it, by implication,
authority to do collateral acts which are the natural and
ordinary incidents of the main act or business authorized.
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978).

-S-

This authority applies even to acts of the agent which were not authorized by
the principal so long as they are within the scope of the agent's employment.
See Kline v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 666 P.2d 711 (1983);
Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 524 P.2d 271, 275 (Ala. 1974). Therefore, what
Margetts knew about that authority and the facts which relate only to the
question of apparent authority are superfluous. Mr. Snow had actual authority
to act for American and it is bound by his representations made to Margetts in
obtaining from him the release that he had been authorized to obtain.
Those superfluous facts are, however, sufficient to establish that Mr.
Snow had apparent authority, in addition to his actual authority, to act for and to
bind American. In Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980), the
referral by a seller to her attorney of a letter written to her by the buyers was
held to be sufficient to clothe the attorney with apparent authority to act for the
seller. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73, 74 (Utah 1983), also
upheld the principle of apparent authority and stated the rule of law as follows:
Apparent authority exists: "[Wjhere a person has
created such an appearance of things that it causes a
third party reasonably and prudently to believe that a
second party has the power to act on behalf of the first
person
" Wynn v. McMahon Ford Co., 414 S.W.2d
330,336 (Mo. App. 1967).

From the very first meeting of the parties every statement on behalf of
American, every offer made by American, every document relating to the
transaction and every communication back to American from Margetts was
made by or passed through Mr. Snow. This was true even when American's
-9-

admitted agent, Mr. Lee Stevens, was present. Mr. Snow spoke for him and
relayed Margetts' responses back to him. New West's assertion, on page 18 of
its brief, that "Margetts failed to establish one fact to suggest that American
Savings ever gave Margetts any reason to believe that Mr. Snow was an agent
for American Savings", flies in the face of all of the facts recited on pages 16-17
and 21-23 of Appellant's Brief. American clearly "created such an appearance
of things that it caused" Margetts "reasonably and prudently to believe that
"Mr. Snow had "the power to act on behalf of" American. New West is,
therefore, bound by the acts of its predecessor's agent, including the
representations made by that agent as to the effect of the total agreement.
POINT III
THE CASES RELIED UPON BY NEW WEST IN
POINT V OF ITS BRIEF DO NOT SUPPORT THE
AWARD OF RENTAL VALUE. INSTEAD THEY
SUPPORT MARGETTS' POSITION THAT UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BY
THE COURT AND HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
New West admits there was no contract to pay rent between Margetts
and American. Its argument in favor of the award of rental value is now based
on cases involving the forfeiture of real property sales contracts or unjust
enrichment. New West did not make any such claims in its pleadings nor at the
trial and the lower court did not make any findings which would support such
claims. New West has cited Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983), and
Abrams v. Financial Service Co., 13 U.2d 343, 374 P.2d 309 (1962), as support
-10-

for this award. These cases both involve claims, based on unconscionable
forfeiture, for the return of payments made by defaulting buyers after the
termination of their contracts, in which rental value is considered as one
element of the seller's actual damages. Those cases have no application here.
Marshall v. Bare, 107 Idaho 201, 687 P.2d 591 (1984), also cited by New
West, involves a home purchase contract which was actually closed and
performed. Rental value for the use of the home prior to closing was not
allowed in that case. The opinion, by way of dictum, would have allowed rental
value in the case of disaffirmance of the contract by the buyer. That, of course,
is not the case here where Margetts was attempting to enforce the agreement
to obtain the condominium and the question before the court was what
constituted that agreement. New West's final case is Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d
1097 (Utah 1988), which held that unjust enrichment did not apply just because
a benefit was conferred upon a party in the absence of some misleading act by
that party. The court, at 1099, quoted from Commercial Fixtures and
Furnishings v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977):
There must be some misleading act, request for services,
or the like, to support such an action. Mere failure of
performance by one of the contracting parties does not
give rise to a right of restitution.
There is no finding in this case of a misleading act, request for services, or the
like, on the part of Margetts, nor any evidence from which such a finding could
be made. Furthermore, this court has held that unjust enrichment and

-11-

inequitable forfeiture could not be considered by the court when those issues
had not been properly raised in the pleadings nor at trial. Weaver v. Bolinder,
Case No. 890230-CA (Utah App. 1990, unpublished opinion). Those questions
were not raised and considered by the lower court and should not be
considered here. Drummond v. Union Pacific R.R., 111 Utah 289, 301, 177
P.2d 903, 909 (1947).
POINT IV
NEW WEST'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE HAS
BEEN PROPERLY RAISED BELOW AND THE
JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER MUST
BE REVERSED.
New West has claimed, in Point VI of its brief, that compliance with the
Unlawful Detainer Statute was not properly raised below. This assertion is
surprising in view of the fact that New West specifically sought relief for
unlawful detainer in its complaint and the allegations of that complaint were
denied in Margetts' answer. That placed this issue of compliance with the
Unlawful Detainer Statute directly before the court and was the basis of the
New West's entire case, since it abandoned its alternative claim for
performance of the agreement (R.538, p.154; R.539, p.334). The lower court
could not properly have granted a judgment in favor of New West without
considering its compliance with the Unlawful Detainer Statute under which it
sought relief.

•12-

The assertion, on page 28 of Appellee's Brief, that Margetts admitted to
having been properly served with a Notice to Quit is also not true. Margetts
admitted to having received a notice to quit but denied all other allegations with
respect thereto (Answer, 11, R. 27-51). That constitutes a denial rather than
an admission that the Notice to Quit was properly served as required by the
statute. Strict compliance with that statute is the essence of an unlawful
detainer action and the burden is on New West to prove that it has fully
complied. That applies to the form of the notice, American Holding Co. v.
Hanson, 23 U.2d 432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970), as well as to the service of the
notice, Carstensen v. Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944). In
Carstensen, the mailing of a notice to quit was held to be insufficient because it
did not comply with the statute. The court stated, at 955:

There could be no need to detail certain explicit methods
of service if any method will do. . . . "Under statutes like
this, it is not the fact that the party to be notified has actual
knowledge of the fact, but it is proof that it has been
conveyed to him in the prescribed method, that gives right
of action.... The statutory method, once broken through,
would open wide the gates for vicious precedents, which
rapidly multiply, and too often, in the end, practically nullify
the will of the legislature." [quoting Hyde v. Goldsby, 25
Mo.App. 29]

Since the decision in that case, the statute has been amended to allow
service of the notice by registered or certified mail, §78-36-6(2), U.C.A., but not
by regular mail. New West has not met its burden of proof to show that it is
entitled to proceed under the Unlawful Detainer Statute. Service by regular
-13-

mail and actual notice by any method, other than those prescribed by the
statute, is simply not sufficient to place one in unlawful detainer.

Other

remedies were available to New West to obtain possession of the property
without the necessity of following the strict requirements of the Unlawful
Detainer Statute, but if it wants the benefits of the summary procedure, it must
follow the steps outlined therein. American Holding Co., supra at 593-5
(concurring opinion).
Likewise, New West's failure to serve Mrs. Margetts with a notice to
quit is fatal to its claim for damages for unlawful detainer. It labels this a
"strange assertion" and claims that the "unlawful detainer statute does not
require that all occupants be personally handed a copy of the Notice to Quit."
(Brief of Appellee, p.28). The statute does require that the notice be served in
one of the four ways listed in §78-36-6, U.C.A., one of which is handing the
notice to the tenant personally. Mrs. Margetts was not served with a notice at
all, let alone in one of the way prescribed by the statute. This same situation
arose in Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446, 449 (1952), in which
the wife was served but the husband was not. The court held:

Unlawful detainer, being a summary procedure, the
statute must be strictly complied with in order to enforce
the obligations imposed by it. The trial court correctly
ruled that the action for unlawful detainer could not be
maintained against Mr. Perkins
So long as he remained in possession, it is difficult to
see how the Spencers could be damaged by the fact that
Mrs. Perkins remained there. Even if she had moved,
Spencers would have had no right to possession of the
premises as against Mr. Perkins. They, therefore,
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suffered no actual damage. In Forrester v. Cook, 11
Utah 137, 292 P. 206, 211, we held that "The damages
which may be recovered in an action such as this one
(unlawful detainer) are measured by the rule that they
must be the natural and proximate consequences of the
acts complained of and nothing more." Nominal damages
to vindicate their right to possession against her is all that
could properly by awarded.

The court in Perkins came to this conclusion even though Mr. Perkins was
working in another county and may not have been actually residing in the home
at the time of service on Mrs. Perkins. Because there was no proof that he had
abandoned the home or that the marriage was not intact^presumed that Mr.
Perkins was occupying the home. The Margetts case is, therefore, a stronger
one for holding that no more than nominal damages could be recovered.
Furthermore, even if Mrs. Margetts had been properly served with the notice,
she was not joined as a party to the action so any judgment could not be
effective against her. New West has not suffered any damages as a result of
Mr. Margetts' occupancy of the property and the judgment for $21,600 for
unlawful detainer must be reversed.
In addition to New West's problems with failure to properly serve either
of the Margetts with a notice to quit, it has not shown how it is entitled to
proceed under the Unlawful Detainer Statute at all.

As pointed out in

Appellant's Brief, pp.30-31, New West has attempted to proceed under §7836-3(1), U.C.A., but it is not entitled to do so because there was no contract
letting the property to Margetts for a "specified term or period", as required by
subparagraph (a), nor any lease of the property for "an indefinite time with
-15-

monthly or other periodic rent reserved", as required by subparagraph (b), of
§78-36-3(1)-

Since the clause having to do with tenancies at will is a

subdivision of subparagraph (b), there must have been a lease of the property
"for an indefinite time with monthly or other periodic rent reserved" before the
subdivision on tenancies at will applies. Otherwise, that subdivision would have
been listed by itself as subparagraph (c), or some other letter designation. This
does not leave New West without a remedy since it always had the nonsummary remedies that existed at common law prior to and after the adoption
of the Unlawful Detainer Statute. American Holding Co., supra at 593-5
(concurring opinion).
New West has suggested, by way of footnote on page 27 of its brief, that
the court could rule that Margetts was in unlawful detainer under §78-36
3(l)(e), U.C.A. That provision requires the service of a notice giving the tenant
the alternatives of performing, after default, a condition or covenant of the lease
under which the property is held or of surrendering the property.

That

provision does not apply in this case since there was no lease or agreement
under which the property was held and no alternative to perform or surrender
was given in the notice. That such an alternative must be given as one of the
strict requirements of the statute was the holding of American Holding Co.,
supra, at 592, with respect to the similar alternative notice required by §78-363(c).
New West was simply not in a position to sue under the Unlawful
Detainer Statute. The judgment for unlawful detainer must be reversed.
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POINT V
THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
FINDS N O £ SUPPORT IN THE RECORD AND
HAS N O ! BASIS IN LAW OR FACT.
New West has again argued, on page 28 of its brief, that the issue of
attorney's fees was not raised in the lower court because, "at trial, Margetts'
counsel requested that a special hearing be scheduled where the prevailing
party would present attorney's fees." How that conclusion follows from the
stated premise is difficult to understand. Yes, Margetts' counsel did suggest
that attorney's fees be considered at a separate hearing but no such hearing
was held and no evidence as to attorney's fees was ever presented. Since
New West was the prevailing party, the burden was on it to schedule such a
hearing and to present its evidence as to fees. There was nothing upon which
the court could make a determination as to reasonableness of fees. See
Commerce Financial v. Markwest Corp., 806 P.2d 200 (Utah App. 1990), in
which the court stated, at 204:
. . . a party seeking attorney fees must support its claim in
the trial court with evidence of their amount and
reasonableness.
«...

. . . . Since C.F. failed completely in its attorney fee proof,
we conclude that, on the evidence presented, the trial
court did not err in denying attorney fees to C.F.
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That case further held that if the action involved several claims, some of which
were based on contract providing for fees and some of which were not, the
failure to apportion the fees would alone be sufficient basis for the trial court's
denial of attorney's fees. That principle is also involved in this case since a
portion of New West's claim was based on a contract, which it abandoned (see
Appellant's Brief, pp.33-34), and a portion was based on an allegation of
unlawful detainer. The failure to apportion the fees means that there could be
no determination as to what amount applied to the successful claim. Without
that determination the judgment cannot stand.
It has been adequately demonstrated in Appellant's Brief, pp.33-35, that
New West did not obtain any judgment based on a claim or dispute under an
agreement which provided for attorney's fees. New West has labeled this a
"truly puzzling" and "bizarre" assertion. Appellee's Brief, p.29. New West is,
of course, ignoring its abandonment of any claim under the Condominium
Purchase Agreement and that it was successful only in obtaining a judgment
for unlawful detainer, which had nothing to do with that agreement. It is also
ignoring the fact that its claimed fees must be apportioned to the matters on
which it prevailed and as to the portion of the case based on a contract or
statute providing for fees, as required by Commerce Financial, supra. It is
further ignoring the fact that fees cannot be awarded under such a contract
when the dispute does not relate to a breach or dispute under the contract.
Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 329 (Utah App. 1990). And, finally, it is
ignoring the fact that the dispute in this case is not under the Condominium
Purchase Agreement but is under the total agreement, including the Twenty
-iS-

Percent Agreement. In fact, since New West claims it is not bound by the
Twenty Percent Agreement so the entire dispute is really over whether or not
the Twenty Percent Agreement applies.

It would, therefore, be totally

inconsistent to hold that the Twenty Percent Agreement does not apply and
then award attorney's fees under a separate agreement that is not in dispute.
Conversely, if fees are to be awarded under the Condominium Purchase
Agreement, because there is a dispute under that agreement, then the Twenty
Percent Agreement must be a part of that agreement since that is the basis of
the entire dispute. It would follow that Margetts must prevail on its arguments
in Points I and II, above, and the award of attorney's fees must be made to
Margetts. That, of course, is what the court ought to order in this case but,
short of that, the judgment for attorney's fees in favor of New West cannot
stand.

CONCLUSION
The dispute in this case is over the entire agreement between the parties,
which includes the Twenty Percent Agreement, which was signed at the same
time and as a part of the entire transaction and was the inducement for the
signing of the other documents. The inconsistencies and ambiguities among
those documents allow the consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret them
and require that the entire agreement be held unenforceable and void unless
Margetts' view of those documents, as represented to him by Mr. Snow, be
adopted. That is the only view that makes any sense under the circumstances.
Mr. Snow was authorized directly by American to negotiate for a release
from Margetts and, therefore, had actual authority to bind American by his
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actions and representations in obtaining that release. Furthermore, by placing
Mr. Snow in a position to speak for it and making all communications to
Margetts through Mr. Snow, American clothed Mr. Snow with apparent
authority to act for and bind it and Margetts was justified in relying on the
statements made by Mr. Snow.
There was no occupancy agreement upon which the court could base its
award of rental value and unjust enrichment was not raised by New West in its
pleadings nor at the trial. The essential elements of unjust enrichment have not
been established. In particular, New West has failed to show that it was
inequitable for Margetts to retain the benefit of occupancy of the condominium,
especially in light of the fact that New West retained the condominium that
Margetts had paid for and did not receive.
Instead of pursuing one of the normal remedies available to it to obtain
possession of the condominium, New West attempted to utilize the summary
procedures of the Unlawful Detainer Statute but without complying with the
strict requirements of that statute. The award of damages under that statute
was, therefore, improper and must be reversed.
The judgment for attorney's fees must also be reversed because there is
no statute or contract which authorizes such an award and there was no
evidence before the court upon which an award of fees could be based. The
only possible justification for an award of attorney's fees would require the
court to hold that the Twenty Percent Agreement, the subject of the dispute in
this case, was a part of the Condominium Purchase Agreement which
authorizes a i award of fees and, therefore, Margetts1 view of the whole
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agreement would be adopted and judgment must be entered in his favor on the
merits as well as to attorney's fees.
The entire judgment should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of
Margetts either rescinding the transaction and reinstating his lien or awarding
him ownership of the condominium, or damages, and his costs and fees. In any
event, the judgment in favor of New West must be reversed.
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